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Introduction: the perennial search for systems
Humankind has been searching for millennia for ways 
to govern itself at large scale and over great distances. 
Overwhelmingly, the dominant solution had been the 
creation of empires, defined as multi-ethnic or multinational 
states with political and/or military dominion over 
populations who are culturally and ethnically distinct from 
the ruling imperial ethnic group and its culture.1 In the 
modern Westphalian era of the past several centuries, a 
hybrid system of governance around the world emerged, 
comprising the nation state (in Europe and the Americas) 
and international empires (across Africa, Asia and Oceania).
In the last quarter of the 19th 
century, the industrial, trade and finance 
activities of those empires gave rise to 
unprecedented internationalisation of 
economic activity. This was the first 
recognisable era of globalisation – 
political and commercial entities starting 
to operate on an international scale. 
However, the great conflicts inherent 
within the system led to world war. The 
experience put paid to rudimentary 
globalisation and the monetary, trade and 
financial systems on which it depended.
Early 20th century: the failure of 
international economic planning
Post-World War One, various 
combinations of European and North 
American nations made six attempts in 
the 1920s and 1930s to re-establish what 
they took to be the three key planks of 
international economic co-operation: 
trade liberalisation, freedom of capital and 
fixed exchange rates. None was completely 
successful. The Paris Peace Conference of 
1919 set a framework for restoring free 
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flows of trade and capital. The issue of 
fixed parities for currencies, however, 
remained unresolved because it was not 
a priority, and because the United States 
resisted. In Brussels in 1920, the League 
of Nations established an economic and 
financial section, but its powers were 
limited. 
In Genoa in 1922 a group of mostly 
European countries re-established the 
gold standard for currencies. In Rome 
in 1930, the Bank of International 
Settlements was set up as ‘the central 
banks’ bank’. In London in 1933 the 
US again rejected a wider system of 
fixed parities. In London in 1936, the 
United Kingdom, the US and France 
signed a stabilisation pact, the Tripartite 
Agreement. It, too, failed to bed in.
The failure to establish an effective 
international trade, financial and 
monetary structure led to high tariffs 
and other damaging competitive policies. 
Economic nationalism became the main 
cause of the Great Depression, which 
lasted from 1929 for a decade. It was the 
longest, deepest and broadest depression 
of the 20th century: global GDP fell an 
estimated 15% (1929–32); international 
trade volume halved; unemployment rose 
as high as 33% (Garraty, 1986).
Mid-20th century: the architecture of 
Bretton Woods 
In the early 1940s a process began on the 
monetary, fiscal and trade framework 
for a set of multilateral institutions that 
would incorporate the lessons of the 
previous two decades. The planning was 
overwhelmingly Anglo-American: in 
July 1944 the US and UK convened the 
International Monetary and Financial 
Conference at Bretton Woods, New 
Hampshire. Agreement was reached to 
create three multilateral institutions: a 
monetary authority, a development bank 
and an international trade organisation. 
The first two – the International 
Monetary Fund and the World Bank 
(International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development) – were established in 
1945. The third failed to get agreement, 
with the US refusing to approve the 
trade body. The more modest General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 
came into existence in 1947.
Financial stability: the IMF
The IMF began operations in March 
1947. The fund’s capital, programmes 
and reach expanded rapidly over the 
following 20 years as North America 
and Europe enjoyed a post-war boom. 
During the 1960s the strong growth of 
the Japanese economy and development 
of other countries required the IMF 
to develop a bigger and broader-based 
capital structure. This led to the creation 
of special drawing rights, a basket of 
members’ currencies, as the fund’s key 
accounting ‘currency’ and capital.
By the late 1960s, however, the great 
expansion of the global economy, and 
great disparities between countries’ 
economic, fiscal and trade performance, 
were generating considerable stress 
within the system of fixed-parity 
exchange rates, still backed by a vestigial 
connection to the gold standard. Under 
these pressures, the Bretton Woods 
architecture unravelled, beginning with 
the UK’s devaluation by 14% against 
the US dollar in April 1967. The end 
of Bretton Woods came in August 1971 
when the US terminated convertibility of 
the dollar to gold, devalued its currency, 
and imposed its first peacetime wage and 
price controls. 
Within two years the currencies of 
most developed economies were floating. 
This fundamental transformation 
increased pressure on governments 
and central banks to manage national 
economies on policies that were deemed 
by investors, capital markets and foreign 
exchange traders to be suitable for this 
increasingly open globalised economy. 
The IMF rapidly became the leading 
arbiter on these issues, exercising great 
influence through its advice, its financial 
support for economies in difficulties, and 
the policy conditions it attached to such 
support. 
Economic development: the World Bank
The World Bank exercised many of the same 
policy prescriptions through its funding of 
national economic development. Its first 
loan in 1947 set conditions foreshadowing 
the institution’s even stricter disciplines 
imposed on subsequent borrowers. It 
closely monitored how a borrowing 
country spent the funds; it required 
the government to produce a balanced 
budget; and it gave priority for repaying 
to the bank over other creditors.
Once the Marshall Plan was in place for 
European countries, the bank shifted its 
focus beyond Europe, expanding its remit 
in the late 1960s to finance infrastructure. 
From 1974 to 1980 it focused on meeting 
the basic needs of the developing world. 
During the 1980s it emphasised lending 
to service Third World debt and for 
economic structural adjustment policies. 
Following severe criticism of the adverse 
environmental impact of its strategies, 
however, the bank began from 1989 to 
bring non-governmental organisations 
and other environmental groups into 
its processes. After the United Nations 
instituted the Millennium Development 
Goals in 2000, the bank oriented most 
of its programmes to helping countries 
progress towards the goals.
From 1980 until the global financial 
crisis in 2007–09 the bank experienced 
a shift in economic philosophy. But 
such changes reflected differing views 
on the nature of development and how 
to deliver help to countries rather than 
on the underlying economic rationale, 
which remained strongly US-centric. 
The end of Bretton Woods came in 
August 1971 when the US terminated 
convertibility of the dollar to gold, 
devalued its currency, and imposed its 
first peacetime wage and price controls.
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Trade liberalisation: GATT and the WTO
As noted, GATT came into effect in 
October 1947, under the auspices of 
the United Nations. In fact, GATT 
oversaw an enormous expansion in trade 
liberalisation. Some simple metrics tell 
the story:
•	 The	first	GATT	negotiating	round	
in 1947 involved 23 countries, 
lasted seven months and delivered 
reductions on 45,000 tariffs affecting 
US$10 billion of trade.
•	 The	sixth,	the	Kennedy	round,	began	
in 1964, involved 48 countries, 
lasted 37 months and achieved tariff 
concessions of US$40 billion of 
trade.
•	 The	eighth,	the	Uruguay	round,	
started in 1986, involved 123 
countries, tackled tariff and non-
tariff barriers, created the World 
Trade Organisation as GATT’s 
successor and lasted 87 months.
•	 The	ninth,	the	Doha	round,	started	
in 2001 and involved 159 countries. 
For four years it unsuccessfully 
tackled tariffs, non-tariff barriers, 
agriculture, labour, environmental 
issues, investment, competition, 
intellectual property and 
transparency issues before excessive 
complexity and multiple deadlocks 
caused it to fall into a nine-year 
coma of inactivity. The WTO finally 
declared it dead in December 2015. 
(Wikipedia, n.d.; Financial Times, 
2015)
The failure of the Doha round has 
occasioned an historic, and perhaps 
fateful, regression from global to sub-
global negotiation context. While the 
WTO is still useful as a trade rules and 
arbitration body, albeit a painfully slow 
and tortuous one, trade liberalisation 
has retrenched into a plethora of 
bilateral and regional multilateral 
agreements. Yet these too now seemed 
to have reached a stalemate. The 
EU and the US have lost sufficient 
political support at home to progress 
the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership, and President Donald 
Trump has withdrawn the US from the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, 
making almost certain its failure to 
come into effect in any form.
For its part, China is establishing new 
financial and economic entities to serve 
as alternatives to those long established 
under earlier Western leadership. These 
include:
•	 negotiations	on	the	Regional	
Comprehensive Economic 
Partnership as a counter to TPPA;
•	 the	Asian	Infrastructure	Investment	
Bank, which is backed by 36 other 
states, including New Zealand, but 
rejected by the US, Canada and 
Japan;
•	 One	Belt,	One	Road,	its	strategy	for	
aid-backed western expansion of 
road and shipping lanes across Asia 
and ultimately to Europe;
•	 a	global	inter-bank	payments	system;	
and
•	 international	exchanges	and	markets	
based in China for oil, gold and other 
commodities.
Late 20th century: crisis in the Bretton 
Woods system
In the final three decades of the 20th 
century the emerging global economy 
wrestled with a series of interlocking 
crises: currency instability, resource stress, 
unequal debt distribution and emerging 
trade protectionism. 
Through this period the IMF 
remained the unwavering developer, and 
enforcer, of the orthodox economic view 
of the world derived from the Bretton 
Woods system. Such orthodoxy, known 
as the Washington Consensus, was 
comprised of a list of policies:
1. fiscal policy discipline, with 
avoidance of large fiscal deficits 
relative to GDP;
2. redirection of public spending from 
subsidies (‘especially indiscriminate 
subsidies’) toward broad-
based provision of key pro-
growth, pro-poor services like 
primary education, primary health 
care and infrastructure investment; 
3. tax reform, broadening the tax base 
and adopting moderate marginal tax 
rates;
4. interest rates that are market-
determined and positive (but 
moderate) in real terms;
5. competitive exchange rates;
6. trade liberalisation: liberalisation of 
imports, with particular emphasis 
on elimination of quantitative 
restrictions (licensing, etc.), any trade 
protection to be provided by low and 
relatively uniform tariffs;
7. liberalisation of inward foreign direct 
investment;
8. privatisation of state enterprises;
9. deregulation: abolition of regulations 
that impede market entry or restrict 
competition, except for those 
justified on safety, environmental 
and consumer protection grounds, 
and prudential oversight of financial 
institutions;
10. legal security for property rights.
The impact of these tenets has 
occasioned considerable controversy. 
Stiglitz described the consensus as ‘a blend 
of ideology and bad science’ (Stiglitz, 
2002). And Rogoff also commented as 
follows:
As the two Bretton Woods sisters 
turn 60, the tough love of the 
International Monetary Fund and 
even the free love of the World Bank 
go largely unrequited. Nowadays the 
twins, never universally admired, 
are constantly attacked from the left, 
from the right, from the centre and, 
Following the global financial crisis, 
... the IMF ... was widely and heavily 
criticised for failing to adequately 
understand and police markets.
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sometimes, by each other. (Rogoff, 
2004)
Early 21st century (part one): tinkering with 
orthodoxy 
The early decades of the 21st century have 
witnessed a struggle by the architects of 
economic policy, steeped in Bretton Woods 
orthodoxy yet aware of its inadequacies in 
the face of a burgeoning global economy, 
to steer a course between defensively 
tinkering with the current institutions 
and contemplating fundamental reform. 
For its part, the IMF continued 
to evolve to keep pace with the rapid 
growth and increasing complexity of 
the global economy and its markets. To 
that end, for example, it established its 
international capital markets department 
in March 2001, and began surveillance 
of international markets. Following the 
global financial crisis, however, the IMF, 
in common with other national and 
international financial regulators, was 
widely and heavily criticised for failing 
to adequately understand and police 
markets. Reviewing its performance after 
the onset of the crisis, the IMF focused its 
response in five broad ways:
•	 creating	a	crisis	firewall:	to	meet	
ever increasing financing needs of 
countries hit by the global financial 
crisis and to help strengthen global 
economic and financial stability, the 
fund greatly bolstered its lending 
capacity after the onset of the crisis. 
This was done by increasing quota 
subscriptions of member countries 
and by securing large borrowing 
agreements;
•	 stepping	up	crisis	lending:	the	IMF	
overhauled its lending framework 
to make it better suited to country 
needs, giving greater emphasis to 
crisis prevention and streamlining 
programme conditionality. Since the 
start of the crisis the IMF committed 
well over US$700 billion in financing 
to its member countries;
•	 helping	the	world’s	poorest:	the	IMF	
undertook an unprecedented reform 
of its policies toward low-income 
countries and quadrupled resources 
devoted to concessional lending;
•	 sharpening	IMF	analysis	and	
policy advice: the IMF provided 
risk analysis and policy advice to 
help member countries overcome 
by the challenges of and spillovers 
from the global economic crisis. 
It also implemented several major 
initiatives to strengthen and to adapt 
surveillance to a more globalised and 
interconnected world, taking into 
account lessons learned from the 
crisis;
•	 reforming	the	IMF’s	governance:	to	
strengthen its legitimacy, in April 
2008 and November 2010 the IMF 
agreed on wide-ranging governance 
reforms to reflect the increasing 
importance of emerging market 
countries. The reforms also ensured 
that smaller developing countries 
would retain their influence in the 
IMF. (IMF, 2016a)
However, the IMF’s progress is not as 
complete as it suggests. While its member 
countries agreed in 2010 to double the 
IMF’s capital, increase its borrowing and 
lending power and rejig its voting rights, 
this has not fully taken effect because 
of US opposition. The main stumbling 
block is the resulting dilution of the US 
stake below 15%, which would remove 
the US veto power.
Despite US intransigence, the IMF has 
continued to adapt as the global economy 
evolves. In November 2015 its members 
accepted China’s renminbi as a reserve 
currency, giving it a weighting of 10.92% 
in the basket of currencies comprising 
the IMF’s special drawing rights.
As Lastra noted, financial institutions 
are only global in good times; they 
retrench to national frontiers when 
things turn sour (Lastra, 2010). This 
state of affairs has to change if financial 
institutions and markets can credibly 
claim to be global. 
Early 21st century (part two): addressing 
fundamental change
The challenges that the international 
monetary and financial system faces in 
the early 21st century are different from 
those which the Bretton Woods system 
confronted in the mid-20th. Then, 
there were narrow issues of exchange 
rate stability and convertibility, trade 
and economic development involving a 
small range of countries. Today there are 
many broader, deeper and truly global 
issues of capital and trade flows, and 
of capital markets and financial system 
supervision. These current challenges 
have been heightened by the global 
financial crisis and its long-drawn-out 
impact on the global economy. There 
are, as Wolf observes, many unsolved 
issues in financial systems and economies. 
These are not inevitable but rather the 
predictable results of policy failures that 
will have long-term consequences (Wolf, 
2014).
The extensive evidence includes 
historically low, and negative, interest 
rates, which suggest monetary policy 
is no longer effective at stimulating 
economic activity (Economist, 2016a); 
weak growth of trade and national 
economies, as the IMF reported in its 
October 2016 forecasts (IMF, 2016b); low 
growth of productivity; and rising debt. 
Two reports by the McKinsey Global 
Institute shed light on this landscape: 
•	 Two	thirds	of	households	in	25	
advanced economies suffered flat or 
falling real incomes between 2005 
and 2014, affecting some 540 million 
people. (Dobbs et al., 2016)
•	 Global	debt	increased	during	the	
global financial crisis (from US$142 
trillion in 2007 to US$199 trillion 
in 2014), and debt’s share of global 
As Lastra noted, financial institutions are 
only global in good times; they retrench 
to national frontiers when things turn 
sour ...
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GDP rose from 269% to 286%. 
China’s debt quadrupled over that 
period, and government debt rose 
in 75% of countries and for 80% of 
households. (Dobbs et al., 2015)
Above all these issues have, in recent 
decades, taken on an intense ecological 
context which humankind has never 
before experienced on a global scale. 
Climate change, loss of biodiversity, 
acidification of oceans, and excessive 
nitrogen and phosphorous flows from 
the use of artificial fertilisers in farming 
are among the biophysical planetary 
boundaries we are comprehensively 
breaching, the Stockholm Resilience 
Centre reports.2 As the World Economic 
Forum put it: 
Global risks materialize in new 
and unexpected ways and are 
becoming more imminent as 
their consequences reach people, 
institutions and economies. We 
witness the effects of climate change 
in the rising frequency and intensity 
of water shortages, floods and storms 
worldwide. Stable societies are 
becoming increasingly fragmented 
in many regions of the world, and 
we note a weak global economy that 
is again facing headwinds. (World 
Economic Forum, 2016)
The World Economic Forum 
identifies the risks of the greatest 
likelihood and with greatest impact as 
failure of climate change mitigation 
and adaptation, water crises, large-scale 
involuntary migration, fiscal crises, 
asset bubbles, unemployment or under 
employment, profound social instability, 
interstate conflict and cyberattacks. Such 
is the impact of these ecological pressures, 
human activity is now the determining 
factor in planetary change. To mark this, 
the International Geological Congress 
has begun the process for declaring this 
epoch the Anthropocene (Economist, 
2016b). Fundamental change is urgently 
needed to help the ecosystem recover. As 
Gus Speth, former chief of the United 
Nations Development Programme, has 
noted: 
I used to think the top environmental 
problems were biodiversity loss, 
ecosystem collapse and climate 
change. I thought that with 30 years 
of good science we could address 
those problems. But I was wrong. 
The top environmental problems are 
selfishness, greed and apathy … and 
to deal with those we need a spiritual 
and cultural transformation. We 
scientists don’t know how to do that. 
(Speth, 2013)
 The UN and Bretton Woods: one system or 
two?
As humanity increasingly perceives the 
planet to be small, finite and fragile, 
and as the Anthropocene imposes an 
unyielding responsibility upon us to find 
our own destiny, an underlying question 
unavoidably arises: what were the reasons 
for the fateful decisions of the mid-20th 
century to create two, separate multilateral 
institutional systems, the United Nations 
for political and military management 
and the Bretton Woods for economic and 
financial management? If the world is one, 
why are there two institutional systems? 
As with Bretton Woods, the UN 
system was a child of wartime planning 
of the early 1940s. Determined not to 
repeat the grave mistakes of the peace and 
economic restoration process after the 
World War One, Western leaders devoted 
substantial efforts from the early 1940s 
to designing and negotiating new global 
economic and political systems. More 
quickly than Bretton Woods, however, the 
UN system responded to the emerging 
global problems and the dawning of the 
Anthropocene. From the late 1980s on, 
the UN began wrestling with the intensely 
complex and interdependent issues of 
human development and ecosystem 
integrity. This work led to the United 
Nations Conference on Environment 
and Development convened in Rio de 
Janeiro in June 1992. The Earth Summit 
produced three key documents:
•	 the	Rio	Declaration	on	Environment	
and Development;
•	 Agenda	21,	a	voluntary,	non-
binding sustainability action plan 
for the UN, its agencies and member 
governments; and 
•	 the	Forest	Principles,	a	non-
binding set of principles for forest 
management.
It also created the Rio Convention, a 
suite of three legally binding agreements 
which were opened for signature: the 
Convention on Biological Diversity, the 
Framework Convention on Climate 
Change and the UN Convention to 
Combat Desertification.
The UN and its member states 
struggled woefully in the following years 
to generate meaningful momentum on 
their non-binding Rio decisions. One 
of the most critical examples was the 
tortuous and inadequate progress on 
climate change. By 2000, however, the 
UN did agree on its eight Millennium 
Development Goals. These included 
eradication of extreme poverty, achieving 
universal primary education and 
ensuring environmental sustainability by 
2015. There was substantial progress on 
some of the goals, particularly poverty 
reduction, by the 2015 deadline. But 
economic, environmental, social and 
cultural sustainability remained a distant 
dream.
Seeking to build on these 
achievements, the UN devised its vastly 
more comprehensive programme entitled 
‘Transforming the world: the 2030 Agenda 
for Sustainable Development’. Adopted 
by member nations in September 2015, 
The challenge before us, to develop a 
well-functioning global economy that 
operates efficiently, alleviates poverty 
and operates within the safe planetary 
boundaries, is immense.
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it consists of 17 Sustainable Development 
Goals, backed by 169 targets. The 
Sustainable Development Goals are an 
admirable attempt to help people and 
societies, institutions and governments 
work on the extremely numerous, 
complex and interdependent issues of 
human development and ecological 
integrity. For its part, the UN is making 
unprecedented efforts to co-ordinate 
more than 50 of its agencies and the 
original Bretton Woods institutions on 
these herculean tasks.
Yet, while these economic, environ-
mental and social challenges are truly 
global, constructive responses to them 
will inevitably be local. But in turn 
communities need local, national, 
international and global mechanisms 
to encourage, guide, prod and require 
action. Then an infinitely large number 
of local changes can aggregate into truly 
global progress towards sustainability. 
Such a view of the world suggests fertile 
territory for global studies. For example:
1. How can nations help their citizens 
achieve a deeper understanding of 
the interlinked human, ecological 
and economic challenges their 
communities face?
2. How can nations learn to address 
and integrate these human, ecological 
and economic imperatives in their 
societies?
3. How can nations learn to build on 
such new approaches to achieve a far 
greater speed, scale and complexity 
of change? 
4. How can nations apply these 
understandings to create and agree 
on new international systems, 
treaties, programmes and other 
measures to fast-forward progress?
5. How can institutions such as the 
UN, its agencies and allied entities 
such as the IMF, World Bank and the 
World Trade Organisation massively 
reinvent themselves so they can help 
lead these transformations?
6. What new technologies, such as 
ubiquitous communications, can 
help create new channels, informal 
systems and formal structures to 
empower individuals and their 
communities in ways local and 
international?
7. How will companies, markets and 
capitalism itself evolve rapidly so 
they can be ethical and effective 
forces for positive change?
8. What attributes of people and 
organisations might help guide such 
work?
The challenge before us, to develop 
a well-functioning global economy that 
operates efficiently, alleviates poverty 
and operates within the safe planetary 
boundaries, is immense. The New 
Zealand Centre for Global Studies is well 
placed to explore the above issues.
The greatest challenge we face is a 
philosophical one: understanding 
that this civilization is already dead. 
The sooner we confront our situation 
and realise that there is nothing we 
can do to save ourselves, the sooner 
we can get down to the difficult task 
of adapting, with mortal humility, to 
the new reality. (Scranton, 2015)
1 Oxford English Reference Dictionary, 2nd edn, 2001, 
p.461.
2 http://www.stockholmresilience.org/research/planetary-
boundaries/planetary-boundaries/about-the-research/the-
nine-planetary-boundaries.html.
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